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The research traditions of memory, rea-
soning, and categorization have largely
developed separately. This is especially
true for reasoning and categorization,
where the former has focused on logic
and probability rules and the latter on
similarity processes. For example, classi-
cal rules of logic are often considered the
basis for human reasoning (Evans et al.,
1991) in tasks such as the Wason selec-
tion task (Wason, 1966), which requires
participants to use deductive reasoning to
solve a logic puzzle involving four cards.
Reasoning models are typically developed
in terms of hypotheses for how relevant
rules should be combined and applied
to reach conclusions from the relevant
premises (Braine et al., 1995). By con-
trast, in categorization, the predominant
theoretical traditions (i.e., prototype the-
ory and exemplar theory) have involved a
similarity process (Wills and Pothos, 2012,
provide an overview).
Such sharp distinctions between cogni-
tive processes have started to break down.
For example, Oaksford and Chater (1994)
proposed a model of the Wason selection
task based on information theory, rather
than logical rules. Their model used infor-
mation maximization in relation to uncer-
tain hypotheses (cf. Anderson, 1991),
which is an idea that could plausibly
translate across other cognitive processes.
Pothos (2010) showed how information
maximization could apply to a learn-
ing task. Heit et al. (2012) argued that
researchers should explore the connections
between memory and reasoning. Tversky
and Kahneman (1983), Shafir et al. (1990)
proposed that when assessing the rel-
ative probability of statements about a
hypothetical person, Linda, participants
employ a process of similarity. Thus, the
idea that similar or identical cognitive
processes may underlie superficially dis-
parate processes, like categorization and
reasoning, is not new. What has been per-
haps lacking is the development of specific
models, which can be applied across dif-
ferent areas. Our purpose is to outline our
ideas regarding such a model for proba-
bilistic reasoning and similarity. We do so
in the context of recent work with cogni-
tive models based on quantum probability
(QP) theory.
Many people are familiar with quantum
mechanics. What is perhaps less known is
that the ingenious physicists who devel-
oped quantum mechanics also invented a
new theory of probability, since classical
probability (CP) theory was inconsistent
with their bold new theory of the phys-
ical world. QP theory refers to the rules
for assigning probabilities to events from
quantum mechanics, without the physics.
QP theory is potentially applicable to any
area where there is a need to compute
probabilities. The motivation to adopt QP
theory is typically informed by whether
the empirical situation of interest reflects
some key properties of QP theory, such
as incompatibility, interference, superpo-
sition, and entanglement. For example,
when two possibilities are incompatible,
this means that it is impossible to con-
currently assign a truth-value to both. So,
if we are certain about one possibility,
then we are necessarily uncertain about
the other. In CP theory it is always possi-
ble to create a complete joint probability
distribution for all available alternatives.
The quantum cognition research pro-
gram is relatively new, but there have
already been several notable applications,
spanning conceptual combination (Aerts,
2009), perception (Atmanspacher et al.,
2004), memory (Bruza et al., 2009), rea-
soning and decision-making (Busemeyer
et al., 2011), and similarity (Pothos et al.,
2013; for overviews see Busemeyer and
Bruza, 2011 and Pothos and Busemeyer,
2013). We note that all these applications
of QP theory in cognition have the form
of standard cognitive models; they make
claims regarding cognitive representations
and processes, without any assumptions
regarding the underlying neural substrate.
In particular, quantum cognitive models
do not require a quantum brain (the quan-
tum brain hypothesis has been extremely
controversial; Litt et al., 2006; Hammeroff,
2007).
QP theory is a geometric approach to
probability where different possibilities (or
events or questions) are represented as
subspaces, of varying dimensionality, in
a multidimensional Hilbert space. Hilbert
spaces are like vector spaces, but with some
additional properties. The system of inter-
est (e.g., the cognitive state of a participant
in an experimental task) is a vector in
the Hilbert space, called the state vector.
Probabilities are determined by project-
ing the state vector onto different sub-
spaces and computing the squared length
of this projection. For example, consider
Tversky and Kahneman’s (1983) famous
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Linda problem, where participants read a
story about a hypothetical person, Linda,
and were asked to judge the likelihood
of different features of Linda. We assume
that the mental state vector corresponds
to the representation of the information
about Linda, after reading the story. As
illustrated in Figure 1, the relevant Hilbert
space includes subspaces for all relevant
features of Linda, such as whether she is
a feminist. Then, to extract the probabil-
ity that a participant in the experiment
will consider Linda to be a feminist, we
project the state vector onto the femi-
nist subspace, and compute the squared
length of this projection. Generally, prob-
ability assignment in QP theory essentially
involves a process of overlap between the
cognitive state (modeled by the state vec-
tor) and different possibilities (modeled
by subspaces). Thus, probability assign-
ment in QP theory is a plausible can-
didate for a similarity process as well.
FIGURE 1 | The QP model for the conjunction fallacy. To calculate the probability that Linda is a
bank teller, we project the state vector (shown in black) onto the bank teller subspace (shown in
blue) and compute the squared length of this projection (shown in orange). To calculate the
conjunction that Linda is both a feminist and a bank teller, we first project the state vector onto the
feminist subspace (shown in red) and then project it onto the bank teller subspace and compute
the squared length of this projection (shown in green).
Indeed, Sloman (1993) independently pre-
sented a model of induction, based on
ideas closely resembling the formal prop-
erties of probabilistic computation in QP
theory.
The process of projection in QP theory
cognitive models is assumed to correspond
to a process of thinking/evaluating the cor-
responding premise. However, for incom-
patible possibilities, it is impossible to
identify a common projection to both rele-
vant subspaces. This is equivalent to saying
that it is impossible to concurrently assign
a truth-value to incompatible observables.
In order to compute a conjunction for
incompatible observables (e.g., as needed
for modeling the Linda experimental task),
Busemeyer et al. (2011) postulated a pro-
cess of sequential projection: the state vec-
tor is first projected onto the more likely
predicate (feminism in the Linda exam-
ple; cf. Gigerenzer and Goldstein, 1996)
and then it is projected onto the less likely
one (bank teller). The squared length of
the resulting vector is the probability for
the conjunction, according to QP the-
ory. Note this number decomposes to the
product of the probability of the marginal
times the conditional, as one would expect
from CP theory. Similar ideas of sequen-
tial projection have been used in other
QP models to account for order effects in
inference and causal reasoning (Trueblood
and Busemeyer, 2011, 2012).
The basic computation Pothos et al.
(2013) proposed for the quantum simi-
larity model is nearly identical. Suppose
we are modeling the similarity of object
A to object B. Similarity assessment is
assumed to involve thinking about the
first object and then the second, a pro-
cess which can be modeled by projecting
first onto the A subspace and then onto
the B one, and computing the squared
length of the resulting vector. Thus, the
computation for assessing the similarity
between A and B is exactly the same as for
computing the conjunction between A and
B, with two exceptions. The first relates
to the order of projection. In decision-
making tasks, we assume that the task does
not typically impose any constraints on
which premise is considered first. A cor-
responding choice has to be made and
choosing the more likely premise first
is a reasonable assumption. In similar-
ity tasks, the similarity question is often
phrased in a way that imposes a partic-
ular directionality (Tversky, 1977) and it
is this directionality which constraints the
order of projection. The second excep-
tion relates to how the initial mental state
vector is determined. In decision-making
applications, the state vector is plausibly
determined by the information initially
presented. In similarity, the state vector is
set so that it does not bias the similarity
judgment toward either of the compared
objects. One may question these assump-
tions. However, QP theory is a mathemat-
ical theory of probability and we cannot
expect psychological predictions to emerge
without introducing some psychological
assumptions too. The assumptions regard-
ing projection order are exactly of this
kind. It is worth noting that the quan-
tum model for the conjunction fallacy pre-
dicts that if a person judges an unlikely
event U before judging the conjunction of
the unlikely event U and a likely event L,
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the effect is smaller than when the ques-
tions are in the opposite order, which has
been confirmed experimentally by Stolarz-
Fantino et al. (2003) and Gavanski and
Roskos-Ewoldsen (1991).
Overall, the decision-making model
for the conjunction fallacy (Busemeyer
et al., 2011) and the similarity model
for Tversky’s (1977) findings have simi-
lar forms. We think that this is a novel
accomplishment, in that we provide a for-
mal and testable expression of the idea that
similarity and reasoning processes may
involve the same or very similar cogni-
tive mechanisms. Of course, the value of
the modeling lies in the extent to which it
can inform empirical prediction. Though
speculative, we currently think there are
a number of promising directions. For
example, order effects in similarity judg-
ments can arise because of differences
in the degree of knowledge we have for
one of the compared elements vs. the
other (such differences can be related to
the relative dimensionality of the corre-
sponding subspaces). It is likewise possible
that, in decision-making tasks, conjunc-
tions in certain directions will be more
natural than others. Tversky (1977) also
reported a diagnosticity effect; where the
similarity between two options resulted in
a third, separate option being preferred
in a matching task. Participants in this
task were asked to decide which country
was most similar to Austria. In one con-
dition, the candidate choices were Sweden,
Hungary, and Poland, and participants
favored Sweden. However, when the can-
didate choices where changed to Sweden,
Norway, and Hungary, participants pre-
ferred Hungary. Tversky explained the
effect through a change in grouping–
Eastern vs. Western Europe in the first
condition and Nordic vs. non-Nordic in
the second. This diagnosticity effect is
analogous to a similarity effect in decision-
making: when introducing an option sim-
ilar to one of the existing options, this
decreases the desirability of the similar
options (cf. Trueblood et al., 2013). The
quantum similarity model can capture the
diagnosticity effect and the same mecha-
nism has the potential to accommodate the
corresponding result in decision-making.
Likewise, the order of projections in
the quantum similarity model allows for
violations of the triangle inequality in
similarity judgments and perhaps similar
violations in decision-making can arise in
the same way. The triangle inequality is
a fundamental property of distance that
must be obeyed by similarity measures
based on simple functions of distance. In
similarity judgments, the triangle inequal-
ity can be expressed as Similarity(A, B)
> Similarity(A, C) + Similarity(C, B).
Tversky (1977) reported a violation of the
triangle inequality by having participants
judge the similarity between three coun-
tries: Russia, Jamaica, and Cuba. He found
that the similarity of Russia and Jamaica
was smaller than the similarity of Russia
and Cuba plus the similarity of Cuba and
Jamaica.
Is it meaningful to consider whether
a general model of cognition could be
based on QP principles? This is certainly
an exciting proposition for researchers in
the quantum cognition area. But a few
qualifications need be noted. First, CP the-
ory cognitive models can be and have been
extremely successful too (e.g., Griffiths
et al., 2010). A preference for the unique
features of QP theory, against CP theory,
can be motivated in situations where there
is evidence of context effects, interference
effects, and sequence effects. It is also pos-
sible that there will be empirical findings
beyond both CP theory and QP theory.
In fact, QP theory is a highly constrained
framework and we already have simple,
non-parametric tests, which can test for
consistency with QP principles (Wang and
Busemeyer, 2013).
All of these possibilities provide
exciting directions for future research.
Although we did not discuss memory pro-
cesses explicitly, there has been initial work
in developing a QP model of memory
recognition (Busemeyer and Trueblood,
2010). In sum, we think that the cur-
rent quantum cognitive models provide
an encouraging starting point in explor-
ing the commonalities between memory,
reasoning, and categorization, because of
the simplicity of the basic ideas and their
applicability across areas.
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